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Abstract
The 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa raised many questions about the control of infectious
disease in an increasingly connected global society. Limited availability of contact information made
contact tracing difficult or impractical in combating the outbreak. We consider the development
of multi-scale public health strategies and simulate policies for community-level response aimed
at early screening of communities rather than individuals, as well as travel restriction to prevent
community cross-contamination. Our analysis shows the policies to be effective even at a relatively
low level of compliance. In our simulations, 40% of individuals conforming to these policies is
enough to stop the outbreak. Simulations with a 50% compliance rate are consistent with the case
counts in Liberia during the period of rapid decline after mid September, 2014. We also find the
travel restriction to be effective at reducing the risks associated with compliance substantially below
the 40% level, shortening the outbreak and enabling efforts to be focused on affected areas. Our
results suggest that the multi-scale approach can be used to further evolve public health strategy
for defeating emerging epidemics.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The initial medical response to Ebola in 2014 focused on caring for individuals in hospital
settings and using contact tracing as the primary preventative measure [1]. Contact tracing
is the accepted method for public health control of infectious diseases [2] and has been the
subject of theoretical and empirical studies [3–13]. Under contact tracing, a patient admitted
to a hospital is asked about their recent direct contacts, and those contacts are monitored
or isolated for the incubation period of the disease [2, 14]. The spread of Ebola to dense
urban communities made it difficult or impossible for contact tracing to work due to the
large number of responders needed to trace contacts when many people are infected. While
some contacts were knowable like family and friends, including those from ritual washing
of the dead, others were untraceable anonymous interactions in public markets, buses, and
taxis[15–18]. For traceable interactions, the number of individuals that are needed to perform
contact tracing activities (interviewing, compiling lists, seeking out contacted individuals,
performing monitoring and isolation of identified individuals) grows with the number of
infected cases. For an exponentially growing number of cases, the number of responders
for an effective response must grow exponentially, and without this level of response, the
number of cases cannot be curtailed [1, 19, 20]. As an alternate approach, we consider
community-based monitoring and limiting travel to reduce inter-community contagion [21].
In community based monitoring, the effort to identify who has been contacted is avoided by
monitoring all members of the community. Such approaches were taken in Liberia beginning
in mid September 2014 [22, 23] and in Sierra Leone beginning in mid December 2014 [24],
and may be responsible for the rapid reduction in cases seen in those two countries. In
particular, in early March 2015, it was announced that there were zero remaining active
cases of Ebola in Liberia [25]. Subsequent intermittent cases have not led to the same level
of crisis. While the Centers for Disease Control Director Tom Frieden attributed much of the
success in the public health effort to the formation of local teams based upon the principle
of RITE (Rapid Isolation and Treatment of Ebola) [26], the World Health Organization
(WHO) has reported community engagement as a key factor in the successful response[18].
The direct cause of the reduction is not well documented. Here we simulate the progress of
an epidemic and found that community monitoring can be highly effective in stopping an
outbreak.
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In general, early detection of Ebola-like symptoms is necessary for early care of patients
with Ebola and limiting new infections. This is due to the extended infectious period and
tendency of the disease to become more contagious as it progresses [27–29]. Contact tracing
addresses this, but it is highly dependent on the patient knowing the people they interact
with, made nearly impossible in urban environments with anonymous interactions. Here
we explore a multi-scale intervention based on these ideas. Instead of monitoring individ-
uals from a list of contacts, a community-based strategy requires that entire communities
be monitored for new cases until infection is ruled out. Symptomatic individuals are iso-
lated and treated to prevent further infections. This community-based early detection is
augmented by restricting long-distance travel or subjecting travelers to extended periods
of limited contact and observation. Restricting travel inhibits cross-contamination between
communities and allows more targeted care to be given to infected communities. The objec-
tive is to progressively limit the disease to smaller and smaller areas and to focus resources
on the areas in which the disease is present. In contrast to contact tracing, the number of
responders needed for community monitoring grows only with the number of infected areas
instead of the number of cases. Moreover, the effort needed to train individuals to screen
for fever, the primary activity, is low, and those performing community monitoring can be
members of that community.
If all new infections could be perfectly isolated through the complete monitoring of the
population, these policies would evidently drastically limit new Ebola cases and result in
an abrupt halt to the epidemic. However, an analysis must account for how effective the
implementation of screening will be. It is infeasible and undesirable to constrain the popu-
lation using high levels of force, so the level of compliance that is achieved is a key variable
in efficacy. Here we model compliance as a probability that individuals will adhere to the
community-level policies. This captures both the possibility of defiance as well as other
sources of performance failure such as accidents or lack of awareness or information. We
analyze the level of compliance necessary for the policies to work effectively. As shown in
Fig. 1, we find that even with 40% compliance the community level policies curtail the
epidemic and a 60% compliance rapidly ends the outbreak.
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FIG. 1: Simulations of an outbreak with a community-level screening intervention.
Screening begins at the vertical dotted line, with a level of compliance indicated by label and
color (green 0 to blue 1.0). A. Number of cases with or without symptoms. Note that even 40%
compliance (0.4) results in decrease in cases. B. Cumulative cases. C. Rt, the effective reproductive
number—the average number of individuals infected by an index case at time t. For an epidemic
to continue to grow, Rt must exceed 1. For 40% compliance (0.4) and greater, Rt decreases below
one, corresponding with a decrease in active cases. Rt drops before t = 70 because policies affect
the contagion of individuals that are initially infected prior to the intervention.
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II. MODEL DETAILS
Simulations of Ebola and other infectious diseases have been performed on complex net-
works [30–35] or spatially-explicit populations [36–40] with interactions on household, com-
munity, and global scales [35, 41–46]. Our analysis of response focuses on the possibility of
local and long range transmission events. We incorporate such events into a transmission
model and test that the results are robust to variations in the model transmission network.
Our model is a Susceptible, Exposed, Infectious, Removed (SEIR) model on a spatial
lattice of individuals (Fig. 2) with periodic boundary conditions. Individuals can be in one
of four states: disease-free and never previously infected (susceptible), infected in the latent
period without symptoms (exposed), infected with symptoms (infectious), and recovered
or dead (removed). Newly infected individuals progress through a latent period for ∆ days
where they are asymptomatic and not contagious. They then become contagious for a period
of Γ days, at the end of which they have either died or have recovered and have acquired
immunity from further reinfection. Each individual interacts with all four of its nearest
neighbors on the lattice once per day, and an infectious individual infects a susceptible
neighbor with probability τ during a given interaction. Each individual also interacts with
another randomly chosen individual from the population. If one of them is infectious, they
have a probability η of infecting the other by this long-range interaction. A schematic of
these interactions is shown in Fig. 2. This mix of local and long-range disease transmission
was chosen for our model to reflect the tendency for Ebola to spread both within households
and through non-local interactions in shared taxis, hospitals, or through other travel [47].
Additionally, it is known that the presence of even a small probability of long-range disease
transmission can allow the rapid spread of an epidemic on a regional or global scale [36].
The community-level public health interventions are modeled based on a proposed policy
draft [21] and include daily checks for symptoms and isolation of individuals found to be
in the infectious state. In our simulations, we allowed the disease to spread unabated for
the first T0 days, after which the intervention policies are put into place. The time until
the start of the intervention is important in measuring the impact of early response on the
control of an emerging outbreak. We assume that, even after the start of the intervention,
individuals cannot be isolated and are fully capable of infecting others on the first day of
their infectious period. This captures the idea that an individual can become infectious
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FIG. 2: Schematic of different types of transmission. Black squares indicate individuals of
a spatially structured population, blue lines denote partitions between communities. A. Neighbor
infection within a neighborhood. B. Cross-partition neighbor infection to another community. C.
Long-range transmission within a community. D. Long-range transmission across a partition.
and infect someone else between symptom checks on consecutive days. With probability
κ, infectious individuals are chosen to be compliant, which means that, after the first day
of their infectious period, they will be perfectly isolated and incapable of interacting with
others for the final Γ− 1 days of their infectious period. The lack of compliance, occurring
with probability 1−κ, is assumed to be complete in the sense that noncompliant individuals
continue to infect others for the duration of their infectious period.
The travel restrictions are implemented based on cordons outlined in the policy draft
[21]. We subdivide the population into square neighborhoods of equal size classified at
each time as one of three types: A, B, or C. The initial type of each neighborhood is
determined by monitoring of the population for Γ days upon the onset of the public health
intervention. Type A neighborhoods are subpopulations in which at least one resident
individual is infectious. Type C neighborhoods are subpopulations for which two criteria
have simultaneously been satisfied: there has not been an infectious case in the past Γ days
and the neighborhood does not share a border with any neighborhoods of type A. Type B
neighborhoods do not have any active infectious cases, but have not yet satisfied the criteria
to become a type C neighborhood. Neighborhoods are updated according to these criteria
every timestep, however, we assume that travel restrictions implemented via a dynamic
cordon prevent transmission of the disease to type C neighborhoods. This ensures that
residents of type C neighborhoods are protected from infection, and renders type C as an
absorbing state. The purpose of the classification is to enable a focus of effort on screening
neighborhoods of types A and B. Given effective interventions, type A neighborhoods will
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progressively be reclassified as type B and then as type C, allowing for resources to be
devoted to the remaining affected areas and facilitating the goal of reaching zero active
cases within the region of intervention.
III. DATA AND PARAMETERS
We used data from the World Health Organization [48] to determine model parameters
that match the exponential growth phase of the Ebola outbreak in Liberia. By performing
an exponential regression, we determined that the cumulative number of confirmed cases,
y(t), in Liberia approximately followed the functional form y(t) ∝ exp (0.052 t), consistent
with the analysis done by Chowell and Nishiura [49]. Comparison with empirical event data
did not affect the conclusions.
It is useful to consider the value of the basic reproduction number, R0, defined as the
average number of individuals infected by a single index case in an otherwise susceptible
population. R0 has a clear threshold value for epidemics: outbreaks with R0 > 1 experience
exponential growth, whereas outbreaks with R0 < 1 die out exponentially. To deduce R0
from the exponential growth rate, we used an expression derived from a mean-field version
of the SEIR model (see Appendix):
R0 = 1 + (∆ + Γ) r + ∆Γr
2
where r is the empirically-measured exponential growth rate of the cumulative number of
cases [50]. Values for ∆ and Γ must be identified in order to obtain a value of R0. We
consider two different sets of parameter values corresponding to two different estimates of
R0 for the 2014 Ebola outbreak in Liberia. These are consistent with empirical bounds on
the parameters [55] and the results are robust to variation in these values as shown below.
First, we considered a latency period of ∆ = 5 days and an infectious period of Γ = 6 days
to reflect the modeling assumptions of Althaus [51]. Using these time periods and infection
parameters of τ = 0.15 and η = 0.0125, we conducted 1,000 simulations and obtained an
average exponential growth rate of 0.054, which results in an R0 estimate of 1.7, comparable
to the value 1.6 obtained by Althaus. The values of τ and η were chosen so that long
range infections occurred but, as observed in West Africa, local infections dominated. The
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specific values do not change the conclusions. As Althaus based his parameter values on
measurements from a previous outbreak on the same subtype of Ebola [51, 52], the figures
presented in the text of the paper are for these parameter values.
Second, we used the parameter values ∆ = 10 and Γ = 7 to compare our model with that
of Chowell and Nishiura, who estimated that R0 = 1.96 [49]. Simulating this epidemic with
infection parameters of τ = 0.18 and η = 0.015, we obtained an average exponential growth
rate of 0.05, with a corresponding R0 value of 2.0, similar to that found by Chowell and
Nishiura. These authors based their parameter values on previously hypothesized epidemic
properties of Ebola [49, 53]. Results using these parameter values are in the Supplement.
For each set of parameters, we simulated compliances ranging from 0.0 to 1.0 in steps of
0.05, and intervention delay times of 50, 70, 90, and 110. Results are averaged over 1,000
simulations of a population of 10,000 individuals, 100 × 100 square lattice, with neighbor-
hoods of size 100, 10×10 sublattices, initialized with 0.02% of the population infectious and
0.02% latent.
IV. RESULTS
Fig. 1 shows the number of current and cumulative cases for various levels of compli-
ance with community level interventions implemented at T0 = 70 days and without travel
restrictions. We found that a relatively low compliance of 0.4 with the community screening
policies was enough to end the outbreak (Fig. 1A). Fig. 1B shows that there is relatively
little difference in the cumulative number of infections over the duration of the outbreak
for the interventions with 0.6, 0.8, and 1.0 compliance. Thus, and perhaps surprisingly, the
greatest gains in reducing the epidemic duration and cumulative number of cases arise from
a particularly low level of compliance.
The impact of intervention policies can be readily seen by plotting the effective repro-
duction number Rt, the average number of secondary infections caused by a primary case
who is first infected at time t [54]. An Rt greater than 1 at a given time implies that the
epidemic will grow exponentially over the short term, while less than one implies it will
decline exponentially. Unlike R0, Rt is designed to reflect the effect of interventions as well
as that of natural epidemic burnout. Plotted in Fig. 1C, we see that compliance levels of
0.6, 0.8, and 1.0 cause the value of Rt to decrease well below the threshold value 1.0 within
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a span of several days. This represents a quick transition from a regime in which the disease
is growing exponentially to a regime in which the epidemic can no longer sustain itself and
consequently dies out. Even with a compliance of 0.4, enough infections were halted to
reduce the value of Rt below 1 (Fig. 1C).
To observe the effects of the travel restrictions, we show the outbreak length and the
cumulative number of infections for interventions implemented at time T0 = 70 with and
without the travel restrictions for our simulated compliance values in Figs. 3A and 3B.
Without travel restrictions, compliance levels between 20% and 40% actually prolong the
outbreak relative to the no intervention case (Fig. 3A). For these levels of compliance com-
munity screening slows transmission but insufficiently to halt the outbreak, so transmission
continues at a slower rate until the population is exhausted. Travel restrictions greatly reduce
this effect. Travel restrictions also noticeably decrease the cumulative number of infections
for low levels of compliance (Fig. 3B). This shows that, in the event of low compliance,
travel restrictions limit the spread and duration of the outbreak.
Comparing the cumulative cases as a function of compliance for different delay times (Fig.
3C), interventions with an earlier start time T0 generally result in fewer cumulative infections.
However, without travel restrictions, this is much less true for low levels of compliance.
Thus, travel restrictions ensure that early policy implementation is effective even at low
compliance. Fig. 3C also shows that higher compliances than 0.6 have comparatively little
impact on the cumulative number of cases.
We visualized the evolution of neighborhood types over time with the cordon to demon-
strate the spatial constriction of the disease with this policy (Fig. 5). The first panel (top
left) shows the geographical distribution of neighborhood types shortly after the policies
come into effect. The infected area shrinks and the ratio of type A (red) to type B (green)
neighborhoods decreases over time.
In Fig. 4 we plot both the reported number of cases in Liberia [55] and our simulation
with T0 = 50 days and a 50% compliance (0.5). Our simulations fit the observed case count
data in Liberia for the parameters chosen, indicating that the early screening intervention
was far from complete, but was sufficiently effective. Since the results of the simulation are
robust to variation in parameters, the correspondence of the real world data in with the
simulation reflects the reduction of Rt below the epidemic threshold Liberia.
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FIG. 3: Effect of compliance on epidemic length and cumulative infections with and
without travel restrictions. A and B: Blue shows the case with travel restrictions, and red
shows the case without such restrictions. Differentiation between the two occurs because the travel
restrictions compensate for low levels of compliance. This decreases the length of the epidemic A
and reduces the cumulative number of infections B in cases of low compliance. C. The cumulative
number of infections over the entire epidemic, as a function of compliance levels and intervention
times. Colors from brown to yellow signify intervention times (50, 70, 90, 110). Without enforced
travel restrictions (dotted lines), a low compliance results in little differentiation between early
and late policy implementation. The travel restrictions (solid lines) dramatically reduce infection
number for earlier interventions at low compliance.
V. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
The compliance analysis presented above is a robustness analysis of the community based
response strategy. Additionally, we tested the robustness of our analysis to the approxima-
tions used to model the network of transmission. This also tests the robustness of the
intervention policies to changes in the societal transmission network. We included networks
in which each person had different immediate neighbors (Moore neighborhood), and ones
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FIG. 4: Comparison of empirical data with simulations Normalized, linear-log plot of
Liberia empirical values (red) compared with simulation data (blue) with T0 = 50 and 50% com-
pliance (0.5).
for which the contact structure itself changes to a small world network model (Kleinberg
network). For the Moore neighborhood network, each individual is connected to its closest
eight rather than four nearest neighbors. The Kleinberg network was implemented by al-
lowing individuals to have a varying number of long-range contacts with their probability of
making that connection decrease with distance. We also allowed the length of the of latent
and infectious periods to vary for individuals across values found by Chowell [56] to allow
for variable stage lengths. Fig. 6 shows the results of the simulations with these different
networks, with τ and η adjusted so that each network’s growth rate has an R0 in agreement
with the observed results for Ebola. The results show the intervention effectiveness remains
high and a compliance above 50% is sufficient to rapidly stop the epidemic. This provides
additional evidence for the relevance of the results to real world conditions despite approx-
imations used in modeling the transmission network. It also indicates that the community
level interventions are highly robust.
We note that recent research on contagious processes on networks that are not geographi-
cally local have considered heterogeneous connectivities across nodes, and specifically power
law node connectivity. Under these conditions highly connected nodes enable the disease
to spread across the entire network at arbitrarily low contagion rates [32]. Cordons that
restrict the contagion by limiting geographical spread would also impose a cutoff on power
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law connectivities leading to a non-zero threshold contagion rate for such networks. By
limiting connectivity to local neighborhoods, cordons bound the maximum connectivity of
an individual and therefore truncate power law connectivity distributions.
We analyzed the effect of community monitoring using a mean field, spatially averaged
approach. The analytic equations are constructed by considering the dynamics of infection
across the entire population. The susceptible population becomes infected by short range
and long range transmission from noncompliant infectious individuals. The parameters are
the compliance c, the short range infectious rate τ , the long range infection rate η, the latent
period ∆, the infectious period Γ, the average number of neighbors per individual z, the
portion of neighbors that are already sick p, the probability that a transmission contact
occurs in an unrestricted neighborhood r, and the probability that the transmission occurs
in the same neighborhood f . The equations for the dynamics are:
dS
dt
= −(1− c)τz(1− p)
N
IS − (1− c)(1− r) η
N
IS − (1− c)rfη
N
IS
dE
dt
= (1− c)τz(1− p)
N
IS + (1− c)(1− r) η
N
IS + (1− c)rfη
N
IS − 1
∆
E
dI
dt
=
1
∆
E − 1
Γ
I
where S represents susceptible, E exposed, and I infectious groups. The first equation can
be written as
dS
dt
= − τ˜
N
IS
where τ˜ = (1−c)[τz(1−p)+η((1−r)+rf)] is the effective transmission rate, encapsulating
all the effects of the infectiousness probabilities in the model. Note that the exposed and
infected populations progress through the disease without interference. The base reproduc-
tion number without intervention R0 for the SEIR model is R0 =
τ
N
SΓ. Therefore, the mean
field value with community monitoring is Rm =
τ˜
N
SΓ. Using this approximate mean field
model, and a value of p estimated from the simulation, the compliance needed to end an
outbreak is c ≈ 0.5 to reduce Rt below 1.0, as compared to c ≈ 0.4 from the simulations
themselves. The consistency of the result is further indication of its robustness.
For a similar analysis of contact tracing, a mean field treatment should separate exposed
and infected populations based on whether or not they were traced [57]. Traced individuals
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are less likely to infect others. The success of contact tracing is dependent on the probability
that an untraced infectious individual is discovered (ρ), and the portion of traced contacts
that are isolated successfully (φ). The reproduction number with contact tracing Rc is
Rc = R0(1 − ρφ) [57]. To reduce Rc below 1 for ebola, ρφ ≥ 0.5. This shows that the
minimum of ρ and φ must be more than 0.5 to reduce Rc below 1 and end the outbreak.
However, if one is at 0.5 they other has to be 1, i.e. 100% successful. Otherwise, success
can be achieved if both are at least 0.7. Thus both the ability to identify contacts and
the successful isolation of those contacts must be sufficiently high. This makes explicit
the requirement that successful contact tracing both identify individuals who have been in
contact with the sick (or dead), and the need to successfully isolate those individuals.
FIG. 5: Contraction of the epidemic areas using cordons and labeled neighborhoods.
A simulated epidemic run on a 300 × 300 lattice with neighborhoods of size 10 × 10, with 70%
compliance (0.7) and a delay of T0 = 50 days. Colored squares represent neighborhoods of types
A (red, known infection), B (green, neighboring known infection), and C (blue, neither A nor B).
Top (left to right) 60, 70, and 80 days, bottom 90, 100, and 110 days. Type C neighborhoods
remain free from infection due to the protection provided by travel restrictions.
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FIG. 6: Simulations for different types of networks. Screening at the dotted lines. Re-
sults are normalized to the number of infected individuals at the time of the intervention. The
intervention is robust against variation in network structure. A. Von Neumann neighborhood of
four nearest neighbors. B. Moore neighborhood of eight nearest neighbors. C. Kleinberg small
world network, with four nearest neighbors and longrange neighbors with probability of connection
decreasing as inverse distance squared.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We found that a policy of community response can be effective at combating disease out-
breaks without relying on information about infected individual’s contact networks. This
highlights the possibility of alternate methods to contact tracing for combating outbreaks.
We have shown the policies require a surprisingly low compliance to end the outbreak. No-
tably, we see that for estimated Ebola parameters, 40% compliance is sufficient, and the
cumulative number of infections in an outbreak is not substantially decreased by compli-
ance higher than 60%. We also found that travel restrictions can be used to reduce the risks
associated with compliance below 40%, and that the pairing of community-level interven-
tions and travel restrictions can result in saving a substantial fraction of individuals from
infection at any level of compliance. Public health interventions implementing variants of
these policies have helped the number of active Ebola cases to reach zero in Liberia in March
2015 [25, 26].
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APPENDIX
A. SEIR Model
We model Ebola using a Susceptible, Exposed, Infectious, Removed (SEIR) model with
a finite, spatially structured population with periodic boundary conditions. In an SEIR
model, each individual can be in one of four states of health:
S (susceptible): Healthy and capable of being infected.
E (exposed): Infected but asymptomatic and incapable of transmitting the illness, other-
wise referred to as latently infected.
I (infectious): Infected and symptomatic. Capable of infecting susceptible individuals.
R (removed): No longer symptomatic, infectious, or infectable. This state includes both
individuals that have survived and gained immunity, and those who have died.
Individuals transition from state to state in the order S → E → I → R. Historically, the
case-fatality rate for Ebola outbreaks has been around 50% [58], so the number of removed
individuals can be divided by two to obtain an estimate of the number of deaths.
The standard non-spatial SEIR model is governed by a nonlinear system of differential
equations. Let S, E, I, and R represent the number of individuals in the corresponding
states, then
dS
dt
= −αSI
dE
dt
= αSI − δE
dI
dt
= δE − γI
dR
dt
= γI
(1)
where δ represents the rate at which exposed individuals become infectious and γ represents
the rate at which the disease removes infectious individuals (either via death or survival with
acquired immunity) [59]. Transmission of the disease requires contact between individuals
in state I and state S. The infection rate parameter α is usually rewritten as κτ
N
, where each
susceptible individual has τ interactions with any of the N other members of population
with probability κ of being infected by an infectious one [59].
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This system of differential equations provides a mean-field representation of the dynamics
of an epidemic with an SEIR structure. We consider potential policy recommendations that
involve explicit change of the contact network structure of the population. For our purpose,
a model based upon this mass-action system of differential equations is insufficient.
B. Spatial Model
We model a population on a square lattice where each individual has three properties:
their current state of health (S, E, I, or R), the amount of time for which they have been
in that state, and whether or not they are compliant with community-level policies. If an
individual is characterized as compliant, then they can be successfully isolated after entering
the infectious state.
Using the definitions from the SEIR model, we consider the rate of transition from state
E to state I to be δ and the rate of transition from state I to state R as γ. For simplicity,
individuals transition deterministically from state E to state I (from state I to state R) after
∆ = 1
δ
( Γ = 1
γ
) time steps. We take ∆ and Γ to be integer numbers of days so that we can
choose each time step of the simulation to represent a single day.
We initialized the population by randomly setting 0.02% of the individuals to be in each
of states E and I, with the remaining individuals starting out in state S. Each individual
was designated as compliant with probability κ. All individuals seeded in state I were
initialized at the beginning of the infectious period, and individuals seeded in state E were
given a random number between ∆ and 3
5
∆ days remaining in the latent period. We chose
0.02% and the initial compartment times in order to smoothy simulate the epidemic growth.
Similations with different small initial numbers of seed cases and seeded state times yielded
essentially the same behavior.
The transmission of the disease involves both local and long-range spreading mechanisms.
Each infectious individual has probability τ of infecting each of its susceptible neighbors
during a given day. Additionally, each susceptible individual chooses at random an individual
on the grid with whom they will interact on a given day and, if infectious, the susceptible
will become infected with probability η. The formal value of the network connectivity is N
as all nodes are connected by the long range transmission probability.
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C. Spatial model R0
The basic reproduction number, R0, is generally defined as the expected number of indi-
viduals that a single seeded individual in state I will infect if the rest of the population is
susceptible. For large population size G, the R0 value of this process, with infectious period
Γ and number of neighbors (z = 4), is approximately given by
R0 ≈ Γη + z
(
1− (1− τ)Γ
)
(2)
The number of neighbors that are infected is given by the second term, and the number
of non-neighbors that are infected is given by the first term. The number of neighbors
that become infected is complicated by the reduction in number of susceptible neighbors
as they become infected from day to day during the infectious period. For the long range
interactions, the effect is small due to the large number of possible sites so that a few new
infections do not affect the number of susceptible individuals the long range interactions can
affect.
To obtain equation 2, consider a neighbor that can be infected by the local infec-
tion process with probability τ and independently, by the long-range infection mechanism
with probability η
G2
. The probability that the neighbor is not infected on a given day is
(1− τ) (1− η
G2
)
. An individual is infectious for Γ days after becoming infected. This means
that the probability of a particular neighbor being infected is
1−
(
(1− τ)
(
1− η
G2
))Γ
= 1− (1− τ)Γ
(
1− η
G2
)Γ
(3)
For z neighbors that can be independently infected (periodic boundary conditions ensure
any such individual has the same number of neighbors), the number of infected neighbors is
(neglecting corrections of O(1/G2))
z
(
1− (1− τ)Γ
(
1− η
G2
)Γ)
= z
(
1− (1− τ)Γ +O
(
1
G2
))
(4)
For large G the number of infected individuals in the neighborhood is thus z
(
1− (1− τ)Γ).
Individuals outside of the infected individual’s neighborhood can only be infected by
long-range interaction. Neglecting corrections of O(1/G2), the infected individual chooses
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one such individual to visit and infects that individual according to the probability η. Since
it is assumed that the concentration of infected individuals is small, the average number of
individuals infected is η. The additional infection is only 1 in G2, which doesn’t affect the
calculation in the next period, so the total number over the infectious period is Γη.
We note that the characterization of R0 differs from the differential equation SEIR (mean
field) model. Since an individual locally infected by the first seeded case has that seeded case
as a neighbor, the expected number of susceptible neighbors is less than the seeded case.
Therefore, it is unjustified to assume the calculation of R0 for the first individual holds for
the rest of the contagion. It is better to think of the value of R0 as the contagion rate in the
low density limit rather than, as is it conventionally discussed, that of a single individual.
The dynamics of the epidemic can be more completely described by the effective repro-
duction number, Rt, defined as the average number of secondary infections caused by an
index case that is infected at time t. This includes the effect of the reduction of the num-
ber of susceptible individuals (epidemic burnout) and susceptible neighbors [36] as well as
the impact of the community-level intervention at varying levels of compliance. Rt can be
approximated by
Rt ≈ Γηst + zt
(
1− (1− τ)Γ) (5)
where zt is the average number of susceptible neighbors for an individual infected at time t
and st is the proportion of susceptible individuals in the whole population. Eq. 5 reduces
to Eq. 2 if a susceptible population is seeded with a single infectious individual, as st ≈ 1
and zt = z, which is an individual’s neighborhood size in the given population structure.
In Fig. 7, we compare the simulated time-series of values for Rt with the time-series of
Rt generated by Eq. 5 using simulated values of zt and st averaged over 1,000 simulations
with ∆ = 5, Γ = 6, τ = 0.15, and η = 0.0125 and no public health intervention. Eq. 5
agrees well with the values of Rt. The value of Rt (2.52) is consistent with Eq. 2 (2.57).
D. Model Parameters and Epidemiological Analysis
In order to make relevant comparisons between the results of our simulations and the
actual 2014 Ebola outbreak, it is useful to choose model parameters so that the spread of
our simulated epidemic matches the real-world spread of Ebola. We chose parameters so
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FIG. 7: Comparison of Rt. The value of Rt measured from the average number of secondary
infections caused by an individual infectied at time t, averaged over 1,000 simulations, is shown
in blue. Rt calculated by Eq. 5 is shown in red. The values of zt and St, the average number of
susceptible neighbors for an individual infected at time t and the average number of susceptibles
in the population at time t, are also obtained from an average over 1,000 simulations.
that the simulated epidemic matches the growth of cumulative case numbers observed in the
Liberia outbreak during the period of exponential growth. Values obtained by comparison
with event data and other methods do not change the conclusions. In addition, we consider
values of ∆ and Γ consistent with the actual mean latent and infectious periods for Ebola
[55] and the results are robust to variation in these values as shown below.. Given these
values of ∆ and Γ, we find values of the infection parameters τ and η so that the growth
rate of cumulative cases in the simulated epidemic is consistent with the actual outbreak.
Given a time series of cumulative cases, x(t), one can estimate the rate of initial expo-
nential growth from a fit to the expression ln (x(t)) = b+λt [49]. Using data from the World
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Health Organization, we find λ = 0.052 for the 2014 outbreak in Liberia, consistent with
the value computed by Chowell and Nishiura [56].
We consider two sets of ∆ and Γ that have been used to describe the Ebola outbreak.
First, we use ∆ = 5, Γ = 6, approximating values of Althaus [51] (∆ = 5.3, Γ = 5.61) taken
from a previous Ebola outbreak with similar immunological properties. We found that this Γ
and ∆, when paired with infection parameters τ = 0.15 and η = 0.0125, produced a Liberia-
like exponential growth rate of 0.0536. The results from simulations with these parameter
values can be found in the main paper.
We also considered the values ∆ = 10, Γ = 7, which are consistent with the values used
by Chowell and Nishiura [56] (∆ = 10.1, Γ = 6.5), who used hypothesized parameter values
proposed by Lekone and Finkenstadt [53, 56]. Using infection parameters of τ = 0.18 and
η = 0.015, our simulated epidemic with this ∆ and Γ produced an exponential growth rate
of 0.0505, which also roughly matches the exponential growth rate in Liberia. Results from
these simulations can be found later in the appendix.
It is common to characterize simulated and real-world outbreaks using R0, the average
number of secondary infectious caused by a single infectious individual in an otherwise
susceptible population. One can obtain an expression for R0 in terms of ∆, Γ, and λ, the
empirically observable exponential growth rate of cumulative cases, through a linear stability
analysis of the mean field SEIR model.
The cumulative number of cases x(t) satisfies x(t) ∝ eλt near the disease-free equilibrium,
where λ is the dominant eigenvalue of the Jacobian matrix obtained from linearizing Eq. 1
around the disease free equilibrium (i.e. where E = I = R = 0 and S = N) [49, 50, 60, 61].
It can be shown that R0 is equal to
R0 = 1 + (∆ + Γ)λ+ (∆Γ)λ
2 (6)
Using Eq. 6 and the exponential growth rates generated from our simulations, we see
that R0 is approximately equal to 1.68 for the ∆ = 5, Γ = 6 simulations, and is equal
to 2.04 for the ∆ = 10, Γ = 7 case. These values of R0 agree well with the values of
1.59 and 1.96 estimated by Althaus [51] and by Chowell and Nishiura [56], respectively.
This provides further confirmation that our simulated epidemics display similar exponential
growth behavior to the 2014 outbreak in Liberia.
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E. Results for ∆ = 10, Γ = 7
We simulated our epidemic with the parameters values ∆ = 10, Γ = 7, τ = 0.18, and
η = 0.015. As shown in Figs. 8 and 9, the qualitative behavior of the epidemic and the
impact of intervention policies were similar to the ∆ = 5, Γ = 6 case. For compliances of
0.6, 0.8, and 1.0, the outbreak ended quickly after the implementation of community-level
isolation policies (Fig. 1A), and the value of Rt dropped well below 1 after a few days. The
primary difference between this case and the one reported in the main paper can be seen in
Fig. 8C where Rt remains near 1 for a long period of time for 0.4 compliance (compare Fig.
8A).
From Fig. 9C, we see that a compliance of 0.6 or higher limits the number of cumulative
infections, and that travel restrictions still substantially help to limit the loss of life in the
case of low compliance. Early implementation of the intervention (lower values of T0) results
in lower infection totals. However, we also see that cumulative case counts without travel
restrictions (dotted lines) only begin to coincide with those with travel restrictions (solid
lines) at higher levels of compliance than in the ∆ = 5, Γ = 6 case. This implies that the
travel restrictions provide benefit at higher levels of compliance for these parameter values.
Since these parameter values reflect a higher R0 value (2.04) than the ∆ = 5, Γ = 6 case,
this suggests that travel restrictions are more critical to halting outbreaks of more virulant
diseases, as is to be expected.
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FIG. 8: Simulations of an outbreak with a community-level screening intervention.
Screening begins at the vertical dotted line, with a level of compliance indicated by label and color
(green 0 to blue 1.0). A. Number of cases with or without symptoms. Note that, compared to
the simulations in the main paper, 40% compliance (0.4) is no longer sufficient to end this more
virulent outbreak. B. Cumulative cases. C. For greater than 40% compliance (0.4), Rt decreases
below one, corresponding to a rapid decrease in active cases. Despite this change, the overall results
are robust as a compliance value of 0.6 is sufficient to end the outbreak.
28
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
Le
n
g
th
 o
f 
E
p
id
e
m
ic
A
With Cordon
Without Cordon
No Intervention
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Compliance Level
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
C
u
m
u
la
ti
v
e
 I
n
fe
ct
io
n
s
B
With Cordon
Without Cordon
No Intervention
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Compliance Level
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
C
u
m
u
la
ti
v
e
 I
n
fe
ct
io
n
s
C
No Intervention
90
70
110
130
FIG. 9: Effect of compliance on epidemic length and cumulative infections with and
without travel restrictions for the second set of paramter values (∆ = 10, Γ = 7). A,B.
Simulations with (blue) and without (red) travel restrictions. The travel restrictions compensate
for low levels of compliance, and their differences are comparable to Fig. 3 in the main paper. C.
The cumulative number of infections over the entire epidemic, as a function of compliance levels
and intervention times. Colors from brown to yellow signify intervention times (70, 90, 110, 130).
Without enforced travel restrictions (dotted lines), a low compliance results in minimal differences
between early and late policy implementation. Travel restrictions (solid lines) dramatically reduce
infection numbers for earlier interventions at low compliance. We chose a slightly later set of
intervention times T0 for this set of parameters because the mean generation length (∆ + Γ)
[56, 62] is about 50% longer, 17 days, compared to the 11 days for the ∆ = 5, Γ = 6 case, so the
exponential growth phase begins at a later time.
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